It's interesting to me, all the people speculating on
"why" animals do things. To begin with, there is not "man"
and "animals", there are just animals, one of which is man. That is
to say, there exists no transcendental category into which all animals fall
under, it is only through the lens of our own values that we perceive them as
all being more alike each other than some are to ourselves, in general.
Furthermore, we are not capable of understanding the sensations, desires, etc.
of another creature directly (hence the tendency to anthropomorphise nature as
a hierarchical government with different species being different castes on the
food chain) and although science may tell us an animal behaves in a certain
manner for some evolutionary reason this does not explain what the creature
itself feels as it behaves, anymore than science telling you your perceived
need for love being a reproductive drive dictates to you what you feel is
*your* reason for seeking such (happiness, comfort, pleasure, etc.).
I hope I'm being clear here, but my point is that there is no reason to presume that 'sentience' (self-awareness) is a quality which precludes many of the same faculties and apprehensions that our moral systems are based on (ability to feel pain necessitating restrictions on inflicting it for example). I see no argument why animals would be excluded. Our moral systems may utilize reason, but the things which they value are not necessarily rational. For example, many would say it is "good" for a mother to take care of her own children and take a kind of pleasure in the thought of "goodness" occurring, but we are not basing this judgement, in the overwhelming majority of circumstances, on the utility of motherhood but rather on the sensations and emotions which arrive from contemplating it, based perhaps on our own experiences with it. We may say that a mother bear protecting her children is "merely a mechanical response adapted for evolutionary needs" maybe, but that should not also preclude it from being "good" given that 1) you can reduce our own values in a similar manner and 2) moral judgements do not have to, and usually do not come from utility, but from sentiment. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for many to feel "moral obligations" regarding the treatment of animals, even if their pride insists on them adopting an attitude of superiority; similarly, many people feel superior to children (as adults possess more developed "sentience"), but children are given more moral weight in issues regarding their treatment precisely because they arouse deep sentiments, regardless of what the origin of those sentiments may be.
I hope I'm being clear here, but my point is that there is no reason to presume that 'sentience' (self-awareness) is a quality which precludes many of the same faculties and apprehensions that our moral systems are based on (ability to feel pain necessitating restrictions on inflicting it for example). I see no argument why animals would be excluded. Our moral systems may utilize reason, but the things which they value are not necessarily rational. For example, many would say it is "good" for a mother to take care of her own children and take a kind of pleasure in the thought of "goodness" occurring, but we are not basing this judgement, in the overwhelming majority of circumstances, on the utility of motherhood but rather on the sensations and emotions which arrive from contemplating it, based perhaps on our own experiences with it. We may say that a mother bear protecting her children is "merely a mechanical response adapted for evolutionary needs" maybe, but that should not also preclude it from being "good" given that 1) you can reduce our own values in a similar manner and 2) moral judgements do not have to, and usually do not come from utility, but from sentiment. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for many to feel "moral obligations" regarding the treatment of animals, even if their pride insists on them adopting an attitude of superiority; similarly, many people feel superior to children (as adults possess more developed "sentience"), but children are given more moral weight in issues regarding their treatment precisely because they arouse deep sentiments, regardless of what the origin of those sentiments may be.
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